Factors behind the Rise and Fall of Left-Wing Terrorism in Western Europe: The Cases of Rote Armee Fraktion and Brigate Rosse

Batı Avrupa'da Sol Tandanslı Terörizmin Yükselişinin ve Düşüşünün Arkasındaki Faktörler: Kızıl Ordu Fraksiyonu ve Kızıl Tugaylar Örnekleri

Göktuğ SÖNMEZ[*]

Abstract

The article discusses the rise and fall of the two famous left-wing terrorist groups, namely Rote Armee Fraktion and Brigate Rosse. After a brief discussion about left-wing extremism, following sections will focus on each group in more detail. After these sections, an analysis of commonalities and differences about their rise and fall will be presented. It is expected that a causal mechanism will be fleshed out not only regarding left-wing terrorist groups but also terrorist groups all around the world regardless of their particular mind-set, which can both open up space for future research and help devising more effective counter-terrorism strategies.

Keywords: *Rote Armee Fraktion, Brigate Rosse, extreme-left terrorism, Stasi, KGB.*

---

[*] Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Konya Necmettin Erbakan University, Department of International Relations; Director, Centre for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, Security Studies, e-mail: goktugsonmez@gmail.com.

Öz

Bu makale öne çıkan iki aşırı sol terörist grubu, Kızıl Ordu Fraksiyonu (Red Armee Fraktion-RAF) ve Kızıl Tugaylar (Brigate Rosse-BR) yapılanmalarını ele almaktadır. Aşırı sol terörizme dair kısa bir tartışmayı takip edecek bölümler bu grupların her birini daha detaylı biçimde ele alacaktır. İki grubun da bu biçimde detaylı olarak ele alınmasından sonra, bu grupların yükseliş ve düşüşlerine dair ortak özellikler ve farklar tartışılacaktır. Böylelikle yalnızca sol terörist gruplara değil, dünya üzerinde hangi fikri zeminde hareket ederse etsin farklı terörist gruplara dair de bir nedenselliğin ortaya çıkarılması umulmaktadır. Bu nedensellikten hareketle bu çalışmanın gelecek çalışmalara kapı açması ve daha etkili terörle mücadele stratejilerinin tasarlanmasına yardımcı olması arzu edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rote Armee Fraktion, Brigate Rosse, aşırı sol terörizm, Stasi, KGB.

Introduction

Especially in the last two decades or so, unsurprisingly quite related to the rise of Al-Qaeda and similar groups in various regions including arguably even more famous ISIS, radicalization and violent extremism that lead to terrorism (VERLT) have been increasingly attributed to the groups acting on a particular religious discourse. However, during the whole historical journey of these phenomena since the Zealots of the 1st century, various cognitive and ideological bases of both radicalization and violent extremism have been existed and the 20th century was not an exception in that respect. These bases or motivations included extreme-left and far-right ideologies, anarchism, as well as many different religious backgrounds from Judaism to Christianity, and from Islam to Buddhism. Probably more obvious than any era, contemporary terrorism and radicalization-related research also point to an important fact which is the close relationship among different forms of radicalization and terrorism and the vicious circle stemming from the process of one group's actions and discourse feeding, inflaming, and even directing one another's actions and discourse. Within this context of various "faces" of terrorism, this article provides

an analysis of two famous embodiments of extreme left-wing terrorism in Western Europe. After offering a brief background on Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and Brigate Rosse, will discuss how and why they failed and what lessons can be derived from these two cases. Among various extreme-left groups, due to the number of attacks as well as their capabilities of carrying out spectacular attacks targeting mid-to-high level public officials, politicians and businessmen and the significant impact on the psychology of their societies compared to other groups with similar ideological discourses in several other European countries such as Belgium and France, the two groups are selected, namely Red Army Faction or Baader-Meinhof Gang in West Germany and Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse) in Italy.

Extreme-left wing radical movements, not much different from far right radical movements, are "marked by zeal, hostility to prevailing institutions, and unyielding intolerance towards ideas and beliefs they consider inimical". The difference stems from how they portray their "enemy" and which characteristics they attribute to it. More specifically, they believe that people are trapped and enslaved by imperialist and profit-seeking capitalist forces and therefore, they need to attain a right form of consciousness, which would, in turn, pave the way for their liberation and emancipation from these "chains". In order to provide people with this "true consciousness" and destroy the established imperialist and/or capitalist forces, once they choose violence as a means, they resort to the use of "bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, assassinations, robberies and random destruction" as some key tactics employed by them, again similar to almost all other forms of violent extremist groups.[1] Therefore, whereas their trajectory is quite similar to different groups and indeed many drivers, pushing these people to carry out violent acts resonates with the existing literature on radicalization and violent extremism in general; their certain ideological

---

[1] Herbert McClosky and Dennis Chong, "Similarities and Differences between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals", *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 329-363, p. 332-340.

beliefs and positioning distinguish such groups from other groups acting on different value systems.

As Claude Lévi-Strauss states, "Dates may not be the whole of history, nor what is most interesting about it, but they are its *sine qua non*, for history's entire originality and distinctive nature lie in apprehending the relation between *before* and *after".*[2] Thus, similarities in term of these groups' rise and fall would provide an important component of the general causal mechanism of how and why terrorist groups can reach their peak point in terms of their attacks and experience demise, split, and dissolution. The particular role played by outside support and backing will also be highlighted with the transboundary links these groups enjoyed, which can shed light on how to counter the groups enjoying similar and/or different forms of external encouragement and logistical and operational support. In that respect, it should be noted that the rise of extreme-left wing terrorism and the USSR's adoption of a more active approach about the "covert operations" in Western Europe after the removal of Khrushchev in 1964 seems far from coincidental as will be seen in the links between the Stasi (and therefore KGB as the link between the two will also be discussed) and such groups.

1. Ex-Nazis in the Establishment, Stasi Link, and Red Terror in West Germany: Rote Armee Fraktion/ Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof Gang)

The extreme-left group is known as Red Army Faction (RAF) and Baader-Meinhof Gang depending on one's ideological approach as well as geographical differences and unsurprisingly, "the gang" labeling has a clear pejorative notion. The group emerged as a radical student movement, enjoying the support and participation of middle-class youth as well as labors. Its positioning against the West German establishment was critical about the establishment's close link with the Nazi past, which provided ex-Nazis with influential positions. The

---

[2] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966, p. 258.

argument follows that the new establishment, without abandoning the Nazi roots, acts as an imperialist and brutally capitalist state mechanism which resorts violence against any oppositional attempt. At the time, it was also to the irritation of many people that there were ex-Nazis in this new establishment and thus, the criticisms about Germany's failure to "face its past" were far from absent, helping the group to garner public support. Therefore, the group primarily targeted the West German elite. Besides, since NATO and the new bloc-based positioning of the West German establishment are to be blamed for the emergence of this "imperialist-capitalist" mechanism, in time, the US military personnel in the country is gradually seen as targets, too.

In terms of the group's emergence as well as radicalization processes of its leadership, the year 1967 was a critical juncture. Andreas Baader, after the murder of a youngster that year, namely Benno Ohnesorg, by the police when the Iranian Shah visited the country, interpreted the incident as a showcase of the similarity between the level of the ruthlessness of Nazi Germany and the West German establishment of that time. It is striking that in 2009, it was revealed that the police officer, Karl-Heinz Kurras, who killed Ohnesorg was a double agent working for the Stasi.[3] Stemming from this conclusion, Baader adopted violence as a key method in order to directly fight the regime and in that regard; first, he detonated homemade bombs in two department stores in Frankfurt.

The group "stressed the importance of violence as a simultaneous act of emancipation". In light of this information, the group made use of different terror tactics such as hijacking, kidnapping, robbery, bombings, and assassinations. According to the group, violating norms and values can challenge "Germans' traditional 'habit of obedience'"[4] which acts

---

[3] Tristana Moore, "The shot that changed Germany", *BBC*, 6/6/2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8085399.stm, (Date of Access: 27.02.2018).
[4] Karrin Hanshew, "Daring More Democracy? Internal Security and the Social Democratic Fight against West German Terrorism", *Central European History*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 117-147, p. 117.

as the social basis of Germany's journey towards fascism once again. Within this context, especially after the group burned department stores, Kommune 1's leaflets have somehow played the role of a propaganda tool, or at least as a means to raise awareness for the group due to close links between the group or its leading cadre and Kommune 1 even though whether this was part of Kommune 1's trajectory of political aims is debatable. The attacks, as well as the idea of an anarchist insurgency, was somehow praised in these leaflets following the attacks,[5] pointing out once again the important link between radicalization, violent extremism, and mass communication regardless of its form available at a certain period of time. After the bombings, which significantly increased the publicity and visibility of the group, Baader was captured and then imprisoned. Following this, the key development engendered the label "Baader-Meinhof gang" took place. Ulrike Meinhof, a journalist with clear extreme-left tendencies, helped Baader's escape from the prison while Baader was on a library visit.

In 1971, the group published its manifesto, The Urban Guerilla Concept. It was also the year when a public poll with striking results was carried out by the Allensbacher Institute of Public Opinion. According to this poll, among one thousand respondents, around 25 percent West Germans under age of thirty was feeling "a certain amount of sympathy for the Red Army Faction" whereas ten percent of North Germans and five percent of all correspondents stated that they would provide shelter for wanted figures.[6] Such figures are a clear showcase of the public support RAF enjoyed at the time. After some key figures including Baader and Meinhof were captured in 1972, in order to see their leaders released, militants stepped up their efforts by carrying out more effective and sensational violent acts. Following their capture, the second generation of RAF members and leaders emerged, carrying

---

[5] Charity Scribner, "Buildings on Fire: The Situationist International and the Red Army Faction", *Grey Room*, No. 26 (Winter, 2007), pp. 30-55, p.35.
[6] Stefan Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF*, Trans. Anthea Bell, New York: Oxford UP, 2009, p. 119.

out attacks after 1972. Some of this second generation members even went abroad to get training, for instance, in the camps of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine –which has close relations with not only RAF but also the Red Army of Japan– as well as in South Yemen.

Here, it is important to note that the Yemeni intelligence service was trained by the East Germans at the time, and the East German Ministry of State Security was fully aware of RAF members' travels.[7] The link between RAF and the Arab Peninsula including weapons transfers especially through three international airports of Baghdad, Aden, and Damascus is also noteworthy in that regard since the airport security units were trained by the Stasi, which is accused of allowing RAF militants carry weapons freely through customs checkpoints. The then chief of foreign operations of the Stasi, and a close friend of Yuri Andropov, a quite famous and even as some accounts argue, "legendary" spymaster General Markus Wolf himself later admitted that as a "charitable work", in order to "reintegrate" former terrorists, the Stasi, as part of its mission to combat terrorism, aided these militants. Considering the KGB had a permanent liaison officer at every command level of the Stasi, this link also points out to an indirect link between RAF and KGB.[8] Based on a quite close relationship between the Stasi and KGB, therefore, rather than a bilateral relationship only between RAF and the Stasi, the existence of triangular structure seems in place.

With the efforts of RAF defense attorneys or "Red Lawyers", the first generation could succeed in disseminating their message to the group's sympathizers outside prisons to go underground and form smaller groups. Following this organizational evolution coupled with the group's grievance about their leaders' imprisonment, while trials are going on, in 1975, they seized the German Embassy in Sweden and killed two attachés in response to Helmut Schmidt's refusal to accept

---

[7] Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF*, p. 269-271.
[8] Jeffrey Steinberg, "Arrests prove Stasi-KGB control of Baader-Meinhof terrorists", *EIR* 17(27), June 29, 1990, pp. 41-42.

the kidnappers' demands. In 1976, Meinhof, who had written that "suicide is the last act of rebellion" months prior to the incident,[9] was found dead in her cell, hanged himself with a rope made of the towels. Then came the peak point of RAF attacks in 1977, the year, which is called as the "German Autumn" with the attacks in the forms of hijacking, kidnapping, murder, and stricter measures adopted by the state in response. In 1977, the group killed the chief public prosecutor and head of Dresdner Bank, abducted Hanns-Martin Schleyer, head of the German Association of Employers and a former member of the Nazi party, and hijacked a plane.[10] Following the failed hijacking, which brought no outcome but rather a disgrace to the group along with the controversial deaths of the first generation RAF leadership, the group, in response to their failed efforts to see their leadership released in return for releasing him, murdered Schleyer with a statement ending "The fight has only just begun. Freedom through the armed anti-imperialist struggle" released afterwards.[11] Here, it is important to remember the head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate General Alexander Sakharovsky's statement in 1971 that airplane hijacking was indeed his "own intervention".[12]

Five days after the hijacking, following GSG9 unit's successful operation to the plane in Mogadishu, Baader, his girlfriend Ensslin, and another leading figure, Jan-Carl Raspe were found dead in their cells in the Stammheim prison. The fact that Raspe and Baader was killed by gun which they should not be able to have and Ensslin's hanging of herself with a cable (which is later on evaluated as too thin to carry a falling body while the chair was too far away from the body to be kicked)

---

[9] Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF*, p. 258.
[10] Clare Bielby (2010), "Remembering the Red Army Faction", *Memory Studies* 3(2), pp. 137-150.
[11] Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF*, p. 418.
[12] Nick Lockwood, "How the Soviet Union Transformed Terrorism", *The Atlantic*, 23/12/2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/how-the-soviet-union-transformed-terrorism/250433/, (Date of Access: 23.03.2018).

in a maximum-security prison raised questions since then. Another leading member in the prison, Irmgrad Möller, who was claimed to have tried to stab himself in the heart yet survived, accused the German establishment of deliberately killing RAF's leadership and disguising these murders as suicides with claims about a "suicide pact" between those people.[13] The German authorities claimed that the gang members realized that there is no hope for them after the murder of Schleyer due to the government's rejection of demands for their release. Moreover, the German authorities stated that there might be a "suicide pact" between the members. However, both of these arguments were found controversial since the members were in complete isolation in their cells. Critics of this approach argue that Raspe had already modified their cell record players, making communication between each other quite easy and effective.[14] Moreover, the prison doctor Dr. Henck's notes about suicidal tendencies of the leading cadre of the group before the incident are also important, reinforcing the West German authorities' claims.[15]

It is also important to note that German establishment also took important legal steps in the late 1970s and security measures and legal regulations were getting harsher, similar to Italy's efforts, which would also be mentioned in the respective chapter. For instance, in 1976, the existing penal code was amended in a way that "support of violence" and "instruction to violence" was also criminalized, increasing the government's leverage in its fight against RAF.[16] The very existence of RAF is regarded as the major driver of the state's institutionalization of maximum-security prisons, fortified courtrooms, and extensive surveillance.

Following internal divergences within the group over the idea that the political goals of the groups failed for good around 1977, several

---

[13] Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF*, p. 410-412.
[14] Ibid., p. 319.
[15] Ibid., p. 361.
[16] Hanshew, "Daring More Democracy? Internal Security and the Social Democratic Fight against West German Terrorism", p. 138.

violent attacks still carried out by the third generation RAF, but now with an even more ambiguous political goal, raising further questions about the group's motives. The connection between the Stasi and RAF was still active in this environment providing its members with funds as well as false documents, and even apartments, jobs, and automobiles in East Berlin.[17] In 1982, the group released its strategy paper Guerilla Warfare, Resistance and an Anti-Imperialist Front where they criticized the hijacking in 1977 and claims that the group even grew stronger after the "German Autumn" and will "open a new chapter in revolutionary strategy in the center of imperialism".[18]

Even though the group had some attacks in 1980s such as killing the Arms Industry executive Ernst Zimmermann and bombing at a US airbase killing two people in 1985 and, killing Siemens executive Karl-Heinz Beckurts in 1986, it had gradually lost its power and popularity it once enjoyed in the 1970s and in 1998, it declared its official dissolution. Some believe that the goal of the group was to cause an excessively oppressive violent reaction from the government, which would raise public awareness and could trigger a popular reactionary movement that can bring destruction for the existing imperialist-capitalist machine and enable the rise of a socialist one instead. Overall, the group's attacks claimed the lives of 34 people (other accounts also states numbers more than 40 including around two dozens of RAF members),[19] which seems quite modest compared to other cases around the world. However, its very existence highlighted the extreme left dimension of violence and terrorism in Western Europe.[20] Due to the quite small organizational structure and membership figures

---

[17] Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF*, p. 433-434 and Steinberg, "Arrests prove Stasi-KGB control of Baader-Meinhof terrorists", p. 41.
[18] Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF,* p. 435-436.
[19] Christina, Stefanik, "West German Terror: The Lasting Legacy of the Red Army Faction." Electronic Dissertation. Bowling Green State University, 2009, p. 57.
[20] Scribner, "Buildings on Fire: The Situationist International and the Red Army Faction", p. 47.

especially with respect to its first generation, its fight was called "a war of six against sixty million" by Aust.[21]

Some of the notes from the hearings of the group's leadership underline important similarities, giving important ideas about the group as a whole and its position regarding several different areas. Reminiscent of the above-mentioned critical approach against the West German establishment, Meinhof, in the trials of 1975, stated that the group's acts are not against the people but the imperialist machine applying state terrorism[22] highlighting the group's stance about resisting the West German establishment, which was regarded by them as imperialist, and capitalist, where ex-Nazis could secure seats. Thus, among the leadership, we witness cohesion in terms of the ideological discourse even though it was not always the case regarding the group's modus operandi. For instance, according to Ulrike Meinhof, the department store attacks, even though not quite effective at the end of the day and even can be subject to criticism in terms of their questionable damage to the system, still showed that the legal system is not for the benefit of the people, but to protect property.[23] After the attacks, in his hearing at court, Esslin made a clear argument not only about the group's modus operandi but as a general approach adopted by dozens of violent extremist and terrorist groups by saying that "We have found that words are useless without action",[24] resonating Baader's choice of violence after Ohneburg's murder as the only method that would count in the fight against the establishment. Besides these parallels in the hearings of different figures from the leadership of the group, those hearings also provide some insight about the drivers behind radicalization journey. In those hearings, frequent references to the Vietnam War and the German society's indifference toward it should also be noted as showing

---

[21] Aust, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF,* p. 148.
[22] Ibid., p. 239.
[23] Scribner, "Buildings on Fire: The Situationist International and the Red Army Faction", p. 40.
[24] Ibid., p. 37.

an important critical juncture both in the world history but also with respect to the rise of extreme-left radicalization and extreme-left terrorism in Western Europe. Taking into consideration the timings of this rise from West Germany to Italy, France and Belgium, this connection with the international developments, and particularly the ones in Vietnam and Cambodia is quite important, reminding us the link between grievances stemming from the interventions and conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and so on and terror attacks by militant Salafi groups which would enter the scene several decades later.

Overall, the group is widely regarded as ideologically confused and, ultimately, especially with the rise of the second generation to some extent and completely so with the third generation, lacking any clear ideological rationale aiming at an achievable ultimate end other than the pursuit of violence.[25] However, putting aside the ambiguity over its ultimate goal, disregarding the group's clear ideological inclination would be doing quite an injustice indeed, even though it is valid to argue that use of violence gradually turned into a tool in itself with the loss of operational capabilities in time. The problem of losing the social-revolutionary dimension was even admitted by the remaining RAF structure in the 1990s, most particularly in their dissolution statement sent to RTL in 1998, entitled "The Urban Guerrilla War is History". Here, they also rightly concluded that as a result of this, the group lost connection with the people and violence was almost everything the group continues to adhere to.[26] Along with the gradual loss of outside backing with the USSR's journey to economic and political reform in the face of its own demise which would significantly affected its ability and will to provide direct and indirect support to such groups, RAF's failure to hold behind the red line of committing too sensational acts that can lose popular support, and its loss of a clear

---

[25] Hanshew, "Daring More Democracy? Internal Security and the Social Democratic Fight against West German Terrorism", p. 129.
[26] Scribner, "Buildings on Fire: The Situationist International and the Red Army Faction", p. 47.

objective (reminding Lenin's criticism about violence with a clear goal directed at anarchists) also played their parts in the group's fall. The West German establishment's harsher security measures should also be incorporated into any analysis trying to make sense of the fall of RAF. Overall, the group "tried to advance revolution from underground but ended up burying it".[27]

2. Years of Lead, Extreme-Left Terrorism, and Italy: The Case of Red Brigades/Brigate Rosse

Brigate Rosse was an active extreme left-wing terrorist group in Italy with the peak point of its attacks in the 1970s, especially in the second half of it, similar to RAF. According to the group, "the working class [was] the revolutionary subject, the capitalist system [was] the enemy, the state [was] the guard dog of the bourgeoisie, and [the] Christian Democracy [was] its party".[28] Therefore, as in the case of RAF, the primary target was the establishment representing a capitalist state mechanism and particularly Christian Democrats who according to BR, was the embodiment of this oppressive system that needs to be destroyed. According to the group's manifesto published in 1975, the group's goal was "striking the heart of the State" since it is an "imperialist collection of multinational corporations".[29] Thus, why and how to challenge the establishment as well as the group's adherence to violence in order to do so were clearly underlined.

---

[27] Ibid., p. 48. RAF, also see John Philip Jenkins , Julius Haswell, "40 years after 'the German Autumn': who were the RAF terror group?", *The Local*, 5/9/2017, https://www.thelocal.de/20170905/10-things-you-ought-to-know-about-the-raf-terrorist-organization-baader-meinhof, (Date of Access: 11.03.2018); Don DeLillo, "Baader-Meinhof", *The New Yorker*, 1/4/2002, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/ 04/01/baader-meinhof, (Date of Access: 18.03.2018), http://germanguerilla.com/2007/ 10/04/the-stammheim-suicides/, (Date of Access: 01.01.2018); "New Pictures of RAF Terror Cell Events Unearthed in Germany", *DW*, 5/8/2008, https://www.dw.com/en/new- pictures-of-raf-terror-cell-events-unearthed-in-germany/a-3539419, (Date of Access: 10.03.2018).
[28] Major Victor H. Sundquist, "Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red Brigades", *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3:3, pp. 53-68, p. 55.
[29] Ibid., p. 57.

Reminding RAF, the group emerged as an extreme leftist student movement, led by Renato Curcio, Alberto Franceschini and Mara Cagol in 1970. Many in the group was influenced by the leftist newspaper *Lotta continua* (Continuous Struggle), started to be published in 1969 with a significant emphasis on what they see as the approaching fascist takeover in Italy,[30] highlighting the close link between mass media tools and radicalization and terrorism once again, reminding us about the contemporary link between new media tools such as social media, and the Internet and its role in that respect. Along with the war in Vietnam, which inflamed a highly critical approach by leftists in Italy and particularly by these emerging radicals, difficulties of poor university students following the stagnation in Italy in 1964 paved the ground for effective propaganda accompanied by increasing number of mass protests.

Here, the mass worker and student protests in Italy between 1968 and 1970, and their cooperation especially after 1969 in such protests should be noted. In line with the social base of the group, universities and factories were unsurprisingly the headquarters for the "resistance". Therefore, the group, at early stages, primarily focused on the University of Trento and its surroundings and the industrial area of the cities of Milano and Turin. By focusing on these particular areas, which also acted as an important source of new recruits, it also expanded its reach in terms of human capital. Following the aid from the Communist bloc via Czechoslovakia especially after 1972, the group further raised its profile and its operational capabilities were also improved. The group enjoyed access to the Soviet-made small arms and explosives and had trained some of its members in the training camps in Syria and Prague.[31] 1974 was the year the group carried out its first

---

[30] Richard Drake, "Italy in the 1960s: A Legacy of Terrorism and Liberation", *South Central Review*, Vol. 16/17, Vol. 16, no. 4 - Vol. 17, no. 1; Rethinking 1968: The United States & Western Europe (Winter, 1999 - Spring, 2000), pp. 62-76, p. 69.
[31] Tristan Dugdale-Pointon, "The Red Brigade Terrorist Group", *History of War*, 19/11/2007, http://www.historyofwar.org/ articles/weapons_red_brigades.html, (Date of Access: 22.02.2018).

homicide and stepped into the realm of terrorism in its fullest meaning. BR members raided the headquarters of a neo-fascists party Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) and killed two members of the party in 1974. The same year, the group also kidnapped prosecutor Mario Sossi.

The group frequently resorted to kidnappings of politicians, prosecutors, and businessmen for ransom along with illegal drug trade which provided the group much needed financial income to maintain its flow of required equipment for further attacks and to attract new recruits. Even though the Marxist-Leninist group is supported by more extreme figures within the Italian Communist Party, since the Party did not support the group as a whole and frequently tried to distance itself from the group based on political developments, its very existence and attacks and how to approach it occasionally became points of tension between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CSPU) and the Italian Communist Party (ICP). Following the ICP's compromise with the Christian Democrats in 1973, but more importantly, after its electoral success in 1976 with an impressive electoral success of getting 34 percent vote, the cause of revolution got less and less visible in ICP's agenda.[32] Consequently, the gap between group and party became wider than ever.

While the group geared up its activities, again in 1974, both Curcio and Franceschini were arrested as a result of the information provided by an Italian spy infiltrated into the group. In 1975, in a police raid, Mara Cagol was killed.[33] After the capture of its leaders, around 1977, the group was split, giving birth to the First Position (Primera Posizione) advocating violent methods whereas the Second Position (Seconda Posizione) was supporting a more moderate political line to bring the change. Whereas the Second Position gradually disappeared, the First Position and its violent approach prevailed for the years to come.[34]

---

[32] Drake, "Italy in the 1960s: A Legacy of Terrorism and Liberation", p. 65 and Alberto Ronchey, "Guns and Gray Matter: Terrorism in Italy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Spring, 1979), pp. 921-940, p. 931.
[33] Dugdale-Pointon, "The Red Brigade Terrorist Group", 2007.
[34] Sundquist, "Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red

The most spectacular attack of the group was kidnapping and then the murder of the former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, which was truly the embodiment of the goal of "carrying the attack to the heart of state".[35] The idea stemmed from the presumption that attacks to the heart of states would bring repressive measures that would result in a more aggressive resistance. In the case of extreme-left discourse, this can be the leading force in a revolutionary war that would emanate people from the chains of capitalist brutalism. Nevertheless, the affair did not go as the group expected but rather became a textbook example of crossing a red line of attacking popular, widely respected figures and going beyond the acceptable levels of violence in the eyes of the people that significantly damages such groups themselves. The group demanded to have the legal status of "insurgents" rather than ruthless criminals and terrorists, which was believed to provide the group the chance to face more preferable law-enforcement measures and a more prestigious position vis-à-vis the state. Once the Italian government refused the group's demands, Moro was murdered. Along with many left-wing politicians, even imprisoned Red Brigade members Curcio and Franceschini condemned the attack and Mario Moretti who shot Moro.[36]

In addition to crossing the line of "acceptable violence" with the Moro affair, the group also cope had to with harsher security measures in the late 1970s. The Italian authorities, in response to the rising terrorism, adopted special measures in order to fight the phenomenon more effectively in 1979. The government significantly intensified its efforts to counter the group's activities and to put an end to its existence. Carabinieri general became the prefect of Genoa as the first military officer holding this office. Also as a part of these measures, people suspected of terrorism could be detained only by the order of a magistrate and they could be interrogated without their any lawyer present.

Brigades", p. 59.

[35] Ronchey, "Guns and Gray Matter: Terrorism in Italy", p. 926.

[36] Sundquist, "Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red Brigades", p. 59.

Moreover, the penalties with respect to terror attacks were hardened including an automatic life sentence for killing public officials whereas cooperation with police could significantly lessen the penalties of people involved in terrorism. The latter helped the police to a great extent in exploring hideouts, large arms deposits and killing and arresting terrorists.[37] In addition to that, the Italian government amended the law in a way that it allows searching buildings without warrants, mandatory identification for transactions more than 20 million lire, and establishment of a new intelligence unit coordinating counterterrorism efforts.[38]

Another major blow to the group's image in the eyes of its target audience came in 1979. A trade union official, Guido Rossa, was killed in 1979, causing serious damage to the support of factory workers the group long enjoyed. The year of 1981 was the year when the group carried out its last major attack. In that year, the US Army Brigadier General Dozier who was also serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for NATO Southern Land forces. Even though Dozier was rescued by the Italian Special Forces, the kidnapping signaled an RAF-like expansion of the list of targets in a way that NATO officials are also included, an approach to be more directly followed by the New Red Brigade (BR-PCC) in the coming years. Several other attacks after the mid-1980s showed that some of the members of the group were still actively engaged with terrorist attacks even though it lost a significant portion of its previous popular support. The attacks after 1984 were carried out by the New Red Brigade, which emerged after the dissolution of the original Red Brigade in the early 1980s and emergence of several splitter fractions.

The New Red Brigades killed the US Sinai Multinational Force commander Leamon Hunt in 1984, the ex-mayor of Florence Lando Conti in February in 1986, General Licio Giorgieri in 1987, and Senator Roberto Ruffilli in 1988. In 1988, the group's leadership issued a statement from

---

[37] Drake, "Italy in the 1960s: A Legacy of Terrorism and Liberation", p. 67.
[38] Diego Muro, "Counter-Terrorist Strategies in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK", *EU Working Papers*, MWP 2010/06, p. 16.

the jail, stating that the armed struggle ended. Here, it should also be noted that in 1991, the Italian Communist Party was renamed as the Democratic Party of the Left, abandoning its previous Marxist-Leninist political and economic discourse.[39] Thus, with the late 1980s, both extreme-left terrorism, as well as a socialist political endeavor, seemed to experience a final blow in Italy.

Some important attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s were also carried out by using the names of The New Red Brigade and BR-PCC even though the connection between the people carrying out these attacks and the original BR, First Position, or BR-PCC was unclear. Considering the BR's earlier splits which gave birth to more moderate groups than violent ones -which are frequently criticized even within the movement itself- and the gradual loss of public appeal and organizational capability in the late 1970s and 1980s, it seems more valid to argue that the attacks might well be carried out sympathyzers of the group rather than an organized and effective real successor organization. The assassinations of the Labor Ministry Advisors Massimio D'antona in 1999 and Marco Biagi in 2002, as well as the bombing of the Institute for International Affairs in Rome in 2001, were the most important attacks within this context. The Italian counter-terrorism measures in 2003 and 2004 against the leading figures of the group in and outside of Italy are believed to have dealt a serious blow to the group, even though some smaller cells could have penetrated into other extreme-left organizations.

In Italy, as a result of terror attacks and guerrilla warfare between 1969 and 1984 only, far-right terrorism and extreme-left terrorism including not only Red Brigade's attacks but also the Nuclei Armati Proletari, and Prima Linea, resulted in not less than the death and injury of more than two thousand people, including politicians, academics, union leaders, and judges.[40] Even though there is a discussion about

---

[39] Drake, "Italy in the 1960s: A Legacy of Terrorism and Liberation", p. 68.
[40] Ibid., p. 62-63.

whether German or Italian extreme-left terrorism was more deadly, it should be noted that with respect to the high level of targets, Italian terrorism "succeeded in" carrying out more sensational attacks in that regard.[41] Overall, terrorism in Italy experienced its peak in the later 1970s, coinciding with the USSR's activist approach adopted regarding "covert operations" in Western Europe referring not only links with communist political parties but also potential extremists and extremist groups as the "fifth column" of communism in those countries. The number of terror attacks in Italy was 702 in 1975, 1198 in 1976, and 2128 in 1977, giving some perspective about the peak point[42] of this era widely called as the "Years of Lead". It should also be noted that the same year, 1977, was also the year when in Bologna, thousands chanted "Viva Curcio" in protests, underlining the group's continuing capability to attract people and consolidate its human base. The trauma of the Italian society stemming from terrorism can be seen in a poll conducted in 1984 where 36 percent of the Italian people said that terrorism is the most important issue that future historians should devote attention whereas only 16,6 percent said so regarding the history of fascism under Mussolini.[43]

Aside from the above mentioned USSR link in extreme left-wing terrorism in Western Europe in general, the Stasi files about some communist terrorists in Europe between 1982 and 1989 including Syrians, Iraqis, Syrians, Palestinians as well as Swiss and Greeks nationals also includes Italian Red Brigade members along with biographical details about them.[44] The link between the "Carlos group" or the Organization of Arab Armed Struggle, led by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, more widely known as Jackal Carlos, to whom the Stasi provided the right to carry a pistol in public, but more importantly

---

[41] Ibid., p. 65.
[42] Ronchey, "Guns and Gray Matter: Terrorism in Italy", p. 924.
[43] Drake, "Italy in the 1960s: A Legacy of Terrorism and Liberation", p. 63.
[44] "Stasi files hold trove of names", *ekathimerini*, 2/9/2002, http://www.ekathimerini.com/8194/article/ekathimerini/news/stasi-files-hold-trove-of-names, (Date of Access: 01.01.2018).

an headquarter in East Berlin and even a support staff consisting of more than 70 people and the extreme-left terrorist groups in Europe is also important in that respect. The "Carlos group", along with militants from ETA, Prima Linea, and RAF, also consisted of members from the Red Brigades and enjoyed backing from the Stasi, in addition to several regimes in the Arab World throughout the 1970s and 1980s.[45] Moreover, the accusations about the Stasi involvement in the Moro affair have not absent either. The accusation is that since Moro's opening to the Italian communists could further endanger already plagued relationship between ICP and CSPU, the Stasi was one of the key actors behind Moro's murder on behalf of CSPU. Since the Italian Communist Party was the strongest of its kind in Western Europe and its loss could trigger a domino effect, it was a partner of which loss is intolerable. Moscow's irritation about the possible complete loss of the links with a highly valuable like-minded group with unprecedented electoral support compared to other communist parties in Western Europe seems valid in that light. Here, it should also be recalled that Italian Communist Party had already distanced itself from Moscow after its leader Enrico Berlinguer declared that his party would cut its ties from Moscow, on whose life an attempt was also made in 1974 when he was in Bulgaria.[46]

---

[45] Richard Cummings, "Special Feature: The 1981 Bombing of RFE/RL", *RFE/RL*, 2/9/1996, https://www.rferl.org/a/1080043.html, (Date of Access: 20.02.2018); "Carlos the Jackal-Organisation of Arab Armed Struggle", *GlobalSecurity*, https://www.globalsecurity. org/military/world/para/carlos-the-jackal.htm, (Date of Access: 06.03.2018); Tony Paterson, "Rescued from the shredder, Carlos the Jackal's missing years", *Independent*, 29/10/2010, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/rescued-from-the-shredder-carlos-the-jackals-missing-years-2120492.html, (Date of Access: 09.03.2018).

[46] Judith Harris, "Aldo Moro Anniversary: Time to Tell the Truth", *iitaly.org*, 4/5/2008, http://www.iitaly.org/printpdf/34384, (Date of Access 17.02.2018). On Brigate Rosse, also see John Philip Jenkins, "Red Brigades", Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, 27/6/2012, https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/ groups/view/ 77, (Date of Access: 02.04.2018); Tristan Dugdale-Pointon, "The Red Brigade Terrorist Group", *History of War*, 19/11/2007, http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_red_ brigades.html, (Date of Access: 22.02.2018); Major Victor H. Sundquist, "Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red Brigades", *Journal of Strategic Security* 3:3, pp. 53-68.

3. Commonalities to Explain the Rise and Fall of Extreme Left-Wing Terrorism in Western Europe

Overall, deducing from what is covered so far, it would be valid to argue that extreme-left wing terrorism in Western Europe, with its most famous two symbols, namely RAF and Red Brigades, suggests a similar pattern of rise and fall. Making sense of not only their fall but also rise can be helpful in terms of challenging terrorist groups today, either sharing the same ideological approach or acting on the basis of totally different mind-sets, norms, values, and discourses. Acknowledging the fact that dealing with different groups would certainly require different tools depending on the particular root causes and local circumstances, some commonalities do exist which would offer an important starting point in the efforts to tackle these groups.

To begin with, with respect to the rise of both RAF and Red Brigades, several key international and transboundary factors need to be fleshed out here. First, it is the impact of international developments and subsequent feelings of sympathy with the "oppressed" in Vietnam and Cambodia along with anti-US and anti-NATO sentiments. Coupled with that, their own societies' indifference also pushed these groups to take action in order to highlight what is happening internationally, and more importantly what is done by the power(s) the establishment of their countries are closely allied. Second, the Stasi connection, which indirectly refers to contact between these groups and KGB and their role in an international network of terrorist groups enjoying support from the Stasi and from several governments in the Arab world is one of the most important components of their rise. Without the international backing in terms of funds, armament, and organizational capabilities, not only for these two particular groups but also for any terrorist group regardless of their mindset would suffer from serious weaknesses against a much more organized and capable state mechanism. Thus, this international connection and the existence of a "big brother" funded and monitored by the "real donor" should definitely be kept in mind since similar links and hierarchical structures with direct consequences on the field is far from absent within the broader historical journey of terrorist groups, and the existing ones are not an exception in that regard.

In terms of domestic factors, discomfort with the establishment and their ideological standpoint, economic difficulties, their governments' gradually increasing integration with the capitalist international economy whereas people are not satisfied with the way the wealth is distributed, the feeling of being marginalized and sidelined from the political and social sphere, and what they regard as harsh security measures applied to the whole society have all played important roles. Making use of such factors -which does not necessarily mean that they utilize them opportunistically and not being directly affected by them or they are not sincere in their ideological positioning- both groups could enjoy certain public support mainly composed of students and labors. Relatively softer legal regulations regarding such acts at the time of their rise also weakened the establishment's deterrence and helped these groups organize and grow stronger. Until the states adopt a stricter approach, these groups could easily take advantage of such a legal atmosphere that had been shaped under the circumstances where there had not been a terrorist threat as serious as these groups posed. While socialist, anti-American and anti-NATO discourse is on the rise with student and labor protests at a time following what is widely referred as the spirit of 1968, there could not be a better time for such groups to flourish and take advantage of the growing public anger in that regard.

Just as with their rise, the fall of these two groups also presents some commonalities. Internationally, their gradual loss of the Soviet support, which they mostly indirectly enjoyed via the Stasi connection as the end of the Cold War approaches and the Soviet economy's gradual transformation and demise dealt a blow to its efforts to support "fifth column" activities abroad, significantly damaged such groups' operational capability. The détente era of the Cold War in the 1970s pushed the leaders of the two blocks to focus more on covert activities such as providing support to like-minded groups if present or help emergence of such actors if absent. In the era, the focus moved to more peripheral regions in order to avoid the danger of direct clashes and superpowers intensified their support to "fifth column" activities. However, in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War was approaching and the winner was becoming more and more visible with the Soviet economy's

failure and following Reagan's "Star Wars" Initiative. From the early 1980's, thus, it was clear that the USSR would not be able to keep up with its main rival and to prevent its economy from experiencing a major crash. In that environment, unsurprisingly, transferring sources for "fifth column" activities while the core of the power is struggling to maintain its very own existence could not keep its position in the priority list of the USSR. The priority was to save at least the core through economic and political reforms and to prevent dissolution. In two decades, however, this goal would turn into the goal of keeping close contact with the countries once part of the USSR, which would bring back this timeless tactic of keeping close contact with like-minded groups and key figures once again. In terms of domestic factors brought the end of these groups, above mentioned stricter law-enforcement measures played an important role. Besides these stricter measures in terms of imprisonment, trials, and penalties, rewarding the ones who cooperate with security forces helped arrest of many people involved in these groups as well as getting important information regarding ammunition, future operation plans, and leading figures. Along with these international and domestic factors, it should be noted that some factors directly related to the very modus operandi and objectives of these groups played an important role in their fall. Within this context, ambiguity or the unrealistic nature of the ultimate goal resulted in internal divisions, as well as divergent approaches to violence were some key weaknesses. Even though these groups enjoyed a certain amount of public support for some time, "crossing the red line", i.e. carrying out particular violent acts against particular actors in such a ruthless way with no clear justification –again partly due to the ambiguity of ultimate goals- beyond "acceptable" levels, damaged not only their internal cohesion, but also social base.

Conclusion

All in all, losing sight of a clear ultimate goal, with a gradually decreasing social base, against harsher internal counter-terrorism measures in an era when they suffer losing their outside support, it was not possible for these groups to maintain an effective presence as they

had once. Even though some of the sympathizers who were not rehabilitated or de-radicalized could carry out several attacks after the end of the Cold War, too, they gradually ended up with dissolution of once disciplined and well-organized structures capable of carrying out sensational attacks.

Observing the cases of RAF and BR, we can conclude that both Crenshaw and Schelling seems quite right in their conclusion that terrorism, especially with respect to its long-term objectives, does not seem to achieve anything "politically significant" and therefore can be regarded as a failure in that respect.[47] However, in terms of repeatability of a successful fight against terrorist groups enjoying transboundary backing, their cases tell us more than that. Their rise and fall and the factors behind them can provide an important starting point in devising strategies against terrorist groups regardless of their ideologies, values, and mindsets. Without overseeing the fact that each group needs to be analyzed in its own context and thus, strategies should also look into the outcomes of these analyses quite carefully and local research and expertise would be of great importance, some commonalities can offer important variables to observe and to respond. Many terrorist groups in the past as well as the contemporary ones shows many similarities in terms of their transboundary character, backing from external donors, taking advantage of states' occasional implication of softer measures or other distractions, using violence to either raise awareness within their target audience or damage their "enemy", carrying out different types of attacks against various figures including high-level people and enjoying a certain amount of public support. Once these similarities listed, it would not be unrealistic to argue that almost all terrorist groups share more than one of these characteristics today as it was the

---

[47] Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches" in David C Rapoport ed., *From Inside Terrorist Organizations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 13-31 and Thomas C. Schelling, "What Purposes Can International Terrorism Serve" in Frey and Morris eds. *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 20.

case in history, if not all. Thus, such an analysis of the groups, as well as their rise and fall, can open up an important area for on future research, which can shed light on decision-making processes.

Özet

Radikalleşme, şiddete varan aşırıcılık/şiddet içeren aşırıcılık ve terörizm, 11 Eylül'den sonra artan biçimde güvenlik çalışmalarını meşgul etmekle beraber, IŞİD'in ortaya çıkışı ve yükselişi ile bu ilgi çok daha ileri bir boyuta taşınmıştır. Bununla birlikte, radikalleşme olgusu incelendiğinde, bunun pek çok fikri zeminden beslenebileceği görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla dinî referanslı radikalleşme ve bu bağlamda El-Kaide ve IŞİD gibi terör yapılanmaları üzerinde literatür hızla gelişirken aşırı sağ ve aşırı sol terörizm üzerinde literatür çok daha kısıtlı kalmıştır. Birbirini tetikleyen, dönüştüren, söylemlerini meşrulaştırmak için araçsallaştırılan bu farklı "radikalleşmeler"in bu bağlamda bütüncül bir perspektifte incelenmesi gerekmektedir. Bununla birlikte, organizasyonel, finansal, eylemsel vb. bazda benzerlikler ve farklar üzerinden terörle mücadele stratejileri bağlamında da her bir örgütün yükseliş ve düşüşünün hem o örgüt özelinde, hem terör örgütleri genelinde mücadeleye katkı sunabileceği gözden kaçırılmamalıdır.

İşte böyle bir hareket noktasından çıkılarak, Batı Almanya'da Kızıl Ordu Fraksiyonu (*Red Armee Fraktion/RAF*) ve İtalya'da Kızıl Tugaylar (*Brigate Rosse/BR*) gibi öne çıkan iki "Batılı" sosyalist terör örgütünün yükseliş ve düşüşlerinin değerlendirilmesinin önem arz ettiği düşünülmüştür. Bulundukları ülkelerde yükseldikleri dönemde mevcut iç dinamiklerin bir "hamle" yapmaya izin verir durumda olması, destek buldukları kitleler, özellikle doğrudan ve dolaylı olarak bulundukları ülke ya da bloğu istikrarsızlaştırmak isteyen dış aktörlerden –genellikle Stasi üzerinden SSCB desteği– aldıkları destek, dönemin kitle iletişim araçlarının örgüte meşruiyet ve insan kazanmak için kullanılması gibi ortak özellikler daha önce sözünü ettiğimiz terörle mücadele ve farklı grupların ortak özelliklerinden hareketle ortaya konabilecek stratejiler bağlamında dikkat çekicidir. Bugünün terör örgütleri de ideolojik, dinî ya da etnik referans noktaları ne olursa

olsun, bu sayılan özelliklerden kimi zaman birkaçını kimi zaman hepsini taşımaya devam etmektedir. Dolayısıyla bahsi geçen iki örgütün "düşüşü" ve bunu sağlayan faktörler bugüne ve yarına da ışık tutabilecek mahiyette olabilecek, uygulayıcılara önemli veriler sunabilecektir.

Örgütlerin "düşüş"ü bağlamında öne çıkan faktörlerden bazıları dış "donör"ün ekonomik zorluklar nedeniyle "beşinci kol faaliyetleri"ne aktaracağı kaynak konusunda yaşadığı sıkıntı; Batı Almanya ve özellikle İtalya otoriterlerince katılaştırılan terörle mücadele stratejileri ve daha etkin hukuki düzenlemeler; bu grupların bulundukları ülkelerde eylemlerine katılacak sürdürülebilir ve kalabalık bir insan kaynağı akışından yoksun olması; "hedef"lerinin hızla muğlâklaşarak şiddetin bu hedefe ulaşmada bir araçtan ziyade kendisi bir amaca dönüşmesi; eylemleri itibariyle kritik bir "kırmızıçizgi"nin geçilmesi; kendi destekçileri tarafından dahi eleştiriye tabi tutulacak düzeyde acımasız eylemlerle toplumun önemli bir kesimi tarafından destek gören kimselerin ya da öne sürülen "ideolojik hedef" doğrultusunda anlamsız silahlı eylemlerin ortaya konması ve dolayısıyla "mesaj" ve "hedef"in tamamen kaybedilmesidir.

Hem RAF, hem BR yapılanmalarının yükselişi ve düşüşünde görülen ortak özellikler, fikri dayanağından bağımsız olarak terör gruplarıyla mücadele bağlamında önemli dersler sunmaktadır. Bu iki örnek vak'a göstermektedir ki, terörle mücadele bağlamında örgütlerin finansal kaynaklarının kesilmesi ve dış desteğin engellenmesi, kitle iletişim araçlarının bugünkü versiyonu olarak öne çıkan internet ve sosyal medya üzerindeki faaliyetlerinin dikkatle ve hukuki sınırlar içerisinde denetlenmesi, değişen ve dönüşen ihtiyaçlara cevap verici nitelikte hukuki düzenlemelerin yapılması gibi temel yöntemler bulunmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, terör yapılanmalarının "hedef"leri ile eylemleri arasındaki tutarsızlığın özellikle çevrimiçi ve çevrimdışı kitle iletişim araçları üzerinden altının çizilmesi hem insan kazanma konusundaki çabalarını engelleyici, hem örgüt içerisinde sorgulayıcı yapıların oluşmasını sağlayıcı bir etki gösterebilecektir. Terörle mücadele ve aktif örgütün sahada zayıflatılması gereğini gözden kaçırmadan sosyal, ekonomik ve siyasi adımlarla bütüncül bir önleyici stratejik tasarım ile de terör örgütlerinin geniş halk tabanına yayılmasının

engellenmesi bir diğer önemli ders olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Her grubun ve hatta her terör eylemcisinin nevi şahsına münhasır özellikleri ve ayırıcı karakteristikleri olabileceği kabul edilmekle beraber terörizm tarihi incelendiğinde hem bugün, hem geçmişte de pek çok örgütle ortaklaşan böylesi özelliklerin mücadele için oldukça önemli bir ana iskelet sunduğu düşünülmektedir.

References
Books
AUST, Stefan, *Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the RAF*, Trans. Anthea Bell, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
LÉVI-STRAUSS, Claude, *The Savage Mind*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.
Articles
BIELBY, Clare, "Remembering the Red Army Faction", *Memory Studies*, 3(2), 2010, pp. 137-150.
CRENSHAW, Martha, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches" in David C Rapoport ed., *From Inside Terrorist Organizations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 13-31.
DRAKE, Richard, "Italy in the 1960s: A Legacy of Terrorism and Liberation", *South Central Review*, Vol. 16/17, 1999, Vol. 16, no. 4 - Vol. 17, no. 1, Rethinking 1968: The United States & Western Europe (Winter, 1999 - Spring, 2000), pp. 62-76.
HANSHEW, Karrin, "Daring More Democracy? Internal Security and the Social Democratic Fight against West German Terrorism", *Central European History*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 117-147.
MCCLOSKY, Herbert and Dennis Chong, "Similarities and Differences between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals", *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 329-363, p. 332-340.
MURO, Diego, "Counter-Terrorist Strategies in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK", *EU Working Papers,* MWP 2010/06.
RONCHEY, Alberto, "Guns and Gray Matter: Terrorism in Italy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Spring, 1979), pp. 921-940.
SCHELLING, Thomas C., "What Purposes Can International Terrorism Serve" in Frey and Morris eds. *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice,* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
SCRIBNER, Charity, "Buildings on Fire: The Situationist International and the Red Army Faction", *Grey Room*, No. 26 (Winter, 2007), pp. 30-55.
STEINBERG, Jeffrey, "Arrests prove Stasi-KGB control of Baader-Meinhof terrorists", *EIR* 17(27), 1990, pp. 41-42.

SUNDQUIST, Major Victor H., "Political Terrorism: An Historical Case Study of the Italian Red Brigades", *Journal of Strategic Security*, 3:3, 2010, pp. 53-68.

Online Sources and News Web Sites

"Carlos the Jackal-Organisation of Arab Armed Struggle", *GlobalSecurity*, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ carlos-the-jackal.htm, (Date of Access: 06.03.2018).

"New Pictures of RAF Terror Cell Events Unearthed in Germany", *DW*, 5/8/2008, https://www.dw.com/en/new-pictures-of-raf-terror-cell-events-unearthed-in-germany/a-3539419, (Date of Access:10.03.2018).

"Red Brigades", Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, 27/6/2012, https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/ groups/view/77, (Date of Access: 02.04.2018).

"Stasi files hold trove of names", *ekathimerini*, 2/9/2002, http://www.ekathimerini.com/ 8194/article/ekathimerini/news/stasi-files-hold-trove-of-names, (Date of Access: 01.01.2018).

"The Stammheim 'Suicides'", *German Guerilla*, 4/10/2007, http://germanguerilla.com/ 2007/10/04/the-stammheim-suicides/, (Date of Access: 01.01.2018).

CUMMINGS, Richard, "Special Feature: The 1981 Bombing of RFE/RL", *RFE/RL*, 2/9/1996, https://www.rferl.org/a/1080043.html, (Date of Access: 20.02.2018).

DELILLO, Don, "Baader-Meinhof", *The New Yorker*, 1/4/2002, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/04/01/baader-meinhof, (Date of Access: 18.03.2018).

DUGDALE-POINTON, Tristan, "The Red Brigade Terrorist Group", *History of War*, 19/11/2007, http://www.historyofwar.org/ articles/weapons_red_brigades.html, (Date of Access: 22.02.2018).

HARRIS, Judith, "Aldo Moro Anniversary: Time to Tell the Truth", *iitaly.org*, 4/5/2008, http://www.iitaly.org/printpdf/34384, (Date of Access 17.02.2018).

HASWELL, Julius, "40 years after 'the German Autumn': who were the RAF terror group?", *The Local*, 5/9/2017, https://www.thelocal.de/20170905/10-things-you-ought-to-know-about-the-raf-terrorist-organization-baader-meinhof, (Date of Access: 11.03.2018).

LOCKWOOD, Nick, "How the Soviet Union Transformed Terrorism", *The Atlantic*, 23/12/2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2011/12/how-the-soviet-union-transformed-terrorism/250433/, (Date of Access: 23.03.2018).

MOORE, Tristana, "The shot that changed Germany", *BBC*, 6/6/2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8085399.stm, (Date of Access: 27.02.2018).

PATERSON, Tony, 2010, "Rescued from the shredder, Carlos the Jackal's missing years", *Independent*, 29/10/2010, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ europe/rescued-from-the-shredder-carlos-the-jackals-missing-years-2120492.html, (Date of Access: 09.03.2018).